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Abstract
We investigate the privacy-preserving problem for point-of-interest (POI) recommendation
system for the rapidly growing location-based social network (LBSN). The LBSN-based
recommendation algorithms usually consider three factors: user similarity, social influence
between friends and geographical location. The LBSN-based recommendation system first
needs to collect relevant information of users and then provide them with potentially inter-
esting contents. However, sensitive information of users may be leaked when the recommen-
dation is provided. In this article, we focus on preventing user’s privacy from disclosure upon
geographical location and friend relationship factors. We propose a geographical location
privacy-preserving algorithm (GLP) that achieves 〈r, h〉-privacy and present a friend rela-
tionship privacy-preserving algorithm (FRP) through adding Laplacian distributed noise
for fusing the user trusts. Subsequently, we integrate the GLP and FRP algorithms into
a general recommendation system to build the privacy-preserving recommendation system.
The novel system enjoys the privacy guarantee under the metric differential entropy through
theoretical analysis. Experimental results demonstrate a good trade-off between privacy and
accuracy of the proposed recommendation system.
Keywords:
POI Recommendation, Privacy Preservation, Fuzzy Location, Differential Privacy
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
With the rapid development of social network sites (SNSs), web 4.0 and mobile de-
vices, a number of location-based social networking services, such as Facebook, Microblog,
Foursquare, Whrrl, etc., have attracted millions of users many of whom even integrate social
networks into their daily lives. The LBSNs allow users to establish online links with their
friends or other users, and to share tips and experiences of their visits to plentiful point-of-
interests (POIs) [? ], e.g., restaurants, stores, cinemas and so on. It is important to enhance
the effectiveness of the POI recommendation and recommend next new POIs to users so that
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the users could explore new places and know their cities better through LSBNs. By doing
this, the system needs to gather lots of important and valuable data, such as the connection
between users, the relationship between the POIs and users and so on. The information
may also be too sensitive to the user since a potential attacker will effectively exploit the
user’s privacy information from the recommended results. Hence, we need to take the user’s
privacy information into account while improving the accuracy of the POI recommendation
system.
Although it is difficult to define the privacy in a precise way, it is not hard to under-
stand the definition of privacy disclosure. If any user’s part of the privacy information is
exposed to an attacker, the privacy disclosure of the user occurs. In general, there are four
types of privacy disclosure: disclosure of identifiers, attributes, social relations and contact
information [? ]. The focus of this paper is on designing algorithm, theoretical analysis and
experimental verification of a recommendation system with a built-in privacy guarantee. We
resort to the technique of differential privacy that is a mathematically rigorous definition of
privacy and is suited to analysis of large datasets and equipped with a formal measurement
of privacy loss [? ? ]. Moreover, differentially private algorithms will be taken by inputting
a privacy parameter, which indicates the permitted privacy loss in any execution of the
algorithm and offers a concrete trade-off between privacy and accuracy.
1.2. Motivation
As the POI recommendation system may use a user’s sensitive information to make
recommendations, the user may not want to accept such a recommendation system. The
incorporation of privacy-preserving methods in a traditional POI recommendation system
has been studied in many literatures [? ? ? ? ? ? ]. Most of them hide the user’s personal
records from the recommendation system, while providing the POI results as appropriate as
possible.
Existing location privacy-preserving techniques exhibit two significant limitations. First,
some require a trusted third-party anonymizer that maintains information of all user lo-
cations. Such an action may not always be available, and it could cause security/privacy
problems by itself. Second, the underlying k-anonymity techniques are generally not ade-
quate enough for location privacy, e.g. the privacy-area aware dummy generation algorithms
for 〈k, s〉-privacy [? ]. They do not consider population densities thereby being inapplicable
for all regions. For example, there may exist a large population density in a shopping street
and a small one in a flat countryside. A static setting of privacy parameters can not adapt
the two cases and even cause a problem of data availability, i.e., to obtain a larger/smaller
privacy region. Intuitively, we need to use different parameter values (〈k, s〉); however, the
existing algorithms do not support to tune a parameter of the population density.
Another challenge is to protect private cyber links information from disclosure in a concise
way. There are usually two extensively studied buddy relationship attacking models [? ],
which are illustrated in Section 3.3 in detail. Daniele et al. [? ] built a POI-Ti-Dico
framework by classifying user roles and cutting space area with different marks. However,
the weakness of the POI-Ti-Dico lies in a completely new model of a real-world case including
a new division of space, a new classification of user roles and so on, i.e., this framework has
a great difference with the existing systems. If applied to practice, it requires a major
transformation for a general recommendation system and results in a relatively high cost.
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1.3. Contributions
The main contribution of this work is to design and analyze a realistic recommendation
system built to provide privacy guarantees. The task is non-trivial because the previous
recommendation systems are not designed towards a new way of privacy protection, and
the previous privacy research has focused on more modest algorithms without attempting
at a practical validation. Our findings are that the privacy does not need to come at a
substantial expense in accuracy. For the approaches we considered, a privacy-preserving
algorithm may start from a geographical location and friend relationships of people who use
the recommendation system. Our new algorithms are as follows.
FRP GLP
Fig. 1. Our contributions on a privacy-preserving recommendation system
Geographical location privacy-preserving algorithm (GLP). In the POI recom-
mendation system, there is an attack mode of location privacy information for users. As
shown in Fig. 1, inspired by 〈k, s〉-privacy, we present GLP to protect the user’s location
information from disclosure. GLP is a controllable fuzzy geographical location algorithm to
make a user’s position into a virtual circle with a dynamic radius based on the population
density, but it does not significantly reduce the recommendation accuracy.
Friend relationship privacy-preserving algorithm (FRP). We introduce the at-
tacking methods by using the friend relationship in the recommendation system. Contrary
to the POI-Ti-Dico framework, we propose a more lightweight and effective controllable al-
gorithm which adopts Laplacian differential privacy to fuse friend relationship by adding
enough noise.
As an additional contribution of this work, we demonstrate the integration of differential
privacy technology into practical systems. We adopt a novel evaluation approach of differ-
ential entropy. Moreover, we give an important formula and quantification standards, which
allow users to control their privacy-preserving levels by choosing suitable private parame-
ters. Experimental results show that our two privacy-preserving algorithms are useful and
effective.
1.4. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related works and Section
3 reviews the POI recommendation system, differential privacy and the private attacking
models. Section 4 presents our privacy-preserving algorithms with respect to the factors of
geographical location and friend relationship, and subsequently proposes theoretical analysis
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on them, respectively. In Section ??, extensive experiments are elaborated to demonstrate
the utility of the proposed methods. Section ?? concludes the work and discusses the future
works.
2. Related work
Dalenius [? ] first proposed private data protection and introduced the purpose of private
database protection explicitly. On the one hand, the attacker can not get any information
in the database if no data is accessed. On the other hand, even if the attacker gets all the
entries except for a particular entry, he can not get any information of this particular one.
Although the definition of privacy was still too vague and he did not provide any accurate
or quantifiable indicators, he provided a general direction for the later study.
Can et al. [? ] gathered 21 online social network problems and presented a review of them
with related applications. A crucial problem is the privacy leak of user social relationship.
Sweeney [? ] proposed the k-anonymity method to solve the problem that even if the explicit
identifier of each entry is deleted, attackers can still infer the entry’s privacy information by
multiple attribute values of the entry with high probability. In a k-anonymous database,
for a given Quasi-Identifier (QID), there are at least k records with the same value, so the
probability of deducing a target record by QID is at most 1/k. However, the assumption of
k-anonymity is that each record in the database corresponds uniquely to an entity. Wong
et al. [? ] proposed the (X, Y )-anonymous method, where X and Y are joint attributes of
records. However, both k-anonymity and subsequent extension methods have a weakness
of “joint attribute attacks” which is that with high probability the attacker can infer the
recorded private information if he cross-matches the data in other public databases or his
other background knowledge with the records in a database that satisfies the k-anonymity.
Machanavajjhala [? ] proposed a diversity principle, also known as l-diversity, to prevent
this type of attack. l-diversity requires that each group of QIDs contains at least l different
values in a privacy attribute. l-diversity is definitely satisfied with k-anonymity if k ≤ l
because at least l records are included in each QID group. However, if the distribution of
sensitive data and global data in some QID groups differ greatly, the attacker may still infer
the private information of the target record with high probability. To response this attack
mode, Li et al. [? ] proposed the t-closeness method which considers the distance between
the privacy data and the overall data for each QID group.
Moreover, Lu et al. [? ] proposed a general preserving method called 〈k, s〉-privacy
which is basing on the generator of virtual nodes to blur geographical location. 〈k, s〉-
privacy is blurring the target position into k private locations and their area is no smaller
than s. Specifically, they proposed two dummy methods called CirDummy and GridDummy
to realize 〈k, s〉-privacy, where CirDummy is dedicated to generating k− 1 additional nodes
in a virtual circle which contains the user’s real position with a random center and an area
of k · s and GridDummy is meant to produce a big virtual square which consists of k small
squares with an area of s and make the user’s real position be a point of any small square.
However, this algorithm has many deficiencies. Firstly, 〈k, s〉-privacy algorithm needs two
parameters k and s, while fixed k and s can not be adapted to all regions since population
densities vary widely from place to place. Secondly, in the design of 〈k, s〉-privacy, there
is no quantification of the actual degree of privacy preservation, so that the user can not
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understand how much private it is if he/she took different privacy parameters. Last but
not least, the privacy parameters may be too large for many of the service providers, so
it has basically lost the value of the data because these large data can not be effectively
used. Niu et al. [? ] proposed dummy-location selection and its enhanced algorithms based
on the entropy metric to ensure that all the regions are far away enough, which achieved
〈k, s〉-privacy but suffered from lack of dynamics.
In addition, no matter whether it is k-anonymity, l-diversity or t-closeness, they all have
corresponding attacking modes that invalidate their privacy algorithms. The primary reason
is that there is no rigorous mathematical definition of the attack model and no quantitative
indicators of the background knowledge of the attacker. Dwork [? ] first presented the
differential privacy method. The first survey summarized by Dwork et al. [? ] repeated
the definition of differential privacy and one of its implementation mechanisms aimed at
exhibiting how to apply these techniques to data publishing and they used the difficulties
encountered in the data publishing process to reflect forward-looking solutions in statistical
analysis [? ]. Followed by the review [? ], they outlined the main incentive scenarios and
summarized future research directions. Task et al. [? ] applied differential privacy to social
network analysis based on graph theory. A book written by Dwork et al. [? ] provided an
accessible starting point for anyone who wanted to study the theory of differential privacy.
Furthermore, Dwork et al. [? ] introduced the concentrated differential privacy which was a
relaxation of differential privacy enjoying better accuracy.
In addition to differential privacy, cryptographic models have also been applied to protect
user privacy. Liu et al. [? ] proposed two privacy-preserving query schemes to protect
location services in Internet of vehicles by taking the advance of fog computing and by
applying oblivious transfer and ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption. Wang et al. [?
] presented the first protocol to protect private data by computing over encrypted data
using Paillier’s homomorphic property and they also provided two optimization methods to
improve their proposed protocol.
In this article, instead of regularly using the static 〈k, s〉-privacy algorithm, we exploit
a new virtual circle technique to directly fuzz the geographical location of a POI which
achieves our novel 〈r, h〉-privacy that leads to dynamic privacy guarantees, i.e., it supports
user-defined degree of geographical privacy preservation. We not only consider user’s location
privacy but also take user’s social network privacy into account. Therefore, we present a
FRP method to concern user’s cyber links that may be revealed any time. Contrary to
Daniele’s complicated POI-Ti-Dico method, we resort to differential privacy to implement a
more lightweight friend relationship privacy-preserving framework. We make a further step
to focus on differential privacy with its Laplacian mechanism because we have to calculate
the social relationship factor which is a numeric value between users in the recommendation
system. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to add Laplacian noise during the
process of calculating social relationship factor but not the final recommendation result in
order to smooth the weights among friend users to avoid social relationship attacks. Through
this idea, we realize and prove our privacy-preserving FRP algorithm enjoying differentially
private guarantees in recommendation servers.
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3. Background
In this section, we first investigate the LBSN recommendation system that simultaneously
considers the similarity between users, the relationship between the user and his friends, and
the user’s geographical location, see e.g., [? ? ? ? ? ], which serve as the building
blocks in our privacy-preserving approaches to exploit fuzzy location and friend relationship
influence. Next we review the concept of differential privacy that will be applied to protect
friend relationship privacy in Section 4.2. Finally, we give some examples of geographical
and friend relationship privacy attacks to explain why we aim to propose privacy-preserving
approaches.
3.1. Collaborative POI recommendation with social and geographical influence
User based collaborative filtering. Let U and L denote the user set and POI set, ci,j = 1
indicates the user ui ∈ U visits POI lj ∈ L and ci,j = 0 means there is no record of ui









where ωi,k represents the similarity between user ui and user uk. We have some ways to
calculate ωi,k such as cosine similarity, pearson correlation coefficients, etc. We select the
cosine similarity which is commonly used in most of the POI recommendation work, i.e.,
ωi,k =
∑









Friend relationship based collaborative filtering. POI recommendation based on social net-
work can be realized by collaborative filtering based on friend relationship which is similar
to Eq.(1). It is defined as
Pr[ci,j] =
∑
uk∈Fi SIk,i · ck,j∑
uk∈Fi SIk,i
, (2)
where Fi denotes the user ui’s friend set and SIk,i represents directional social influence
weight uk has on ui. SIk,i is not equal to SIi,k all the time. One way to compute the social
influence between two friends is based on both of their social links and similarity of their
check-in behaviors.
SIk,i = γ ·
|Fk ∩ Fi|
|Fk ∪ Fi|
+ (1− γ) · |Lk ∩ Li|
|Lk ∪ Li|
, (3)
where γ (γ ∈ [0, 1]) is the tuning parameter and Lk denotes the POIs that uk has visited.
Geographical location influence. Analogous to [? ], we use the exponential distribution and
choose the naive Bayesian method to calculate the geographic factor values. For a user ui







where d(lm, ln) represents the distance between POI lm and ln. Pr[d(lm, ln)] follows the
exponential distribution and Pr[d(lm, ln)] = a × d(lm, ln)b [? ]. There is a hypothesis that
the distances of all POI pairs are independent of each other. Thus, for a given POI lj, the













Hence, we can calculate the probability Pr[lj
∣∣Li] (lj ∈ L−Li) of the POI that the user does
not check in yet and sort it in descending order, and then recommend top-K POIs to the
user.
As discussed, we can integrate the user similarity factor, the friend relationship factor
and the geographical location factor into a linear function, then calculate the probability
that the user will check in a new POI. Let Si,j be the probability that user ui will check






i,j be the same probability, corresponding to the factors of
user similarity, the friend relationship, and geographical location respectively. Then, Si,j is
defined as
Si,j = (1− α− β)Sui,j + αSsi,j + βS
g
i,j, (5)
where α and β are the two weighting parameters satisfying 0 < α+β 6 1. In order to obtain





user ui to visit a POI lj, respectively. Here, we compute them according to Eq.(1), Eq.(2)












, where Zgi = maxlj∈L−Li{p
g
i,j},




i are the normalization terms.
3.2. Differential privacy for preserving friend relationship
Definition 3.1 ((ε, δ)-differential privacy). [? ] A randomized mechanism Mpriv(·) :
D → S gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for every set of outputs Ω ⊆ S and for two adjacent
datasets of D and D′, Mpriv satisfies
Pr[Mpriv(D) ∈ Ω] 6 eε · Pr[Mpriv(D′) ∈ Ω] + δ, (6)
where datasets D and D′ are adjacent if they differ in at most one record. Its strictest defini-
tion does not include the additive term δ, i.e., if δ = 0, the randomized mechanism Mpriv(·)
gives ε-differential privacy. (ε, δ)-differential privacy provides freedom to strict differential
privacy for some low probability events. ε-differential privacy is usually called pure differ-
ential privacy, while (ε, δ)-differential privacy with δ > 0 is called approximate differential
privacy [? ].
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In Definition 3.1, the private parameter ε indicates the privacy budget [? ] which
gives strong privacy guarantees with a small ε. Differential privacy has some particularly
useful properties in our works such as composability and robustness of auxiliary information.
Composability refers that if all the mechanisms are differentially private, then so is their
composition. Robustness means that auxiliary information of the adversary can not break
the privacy guarantee.
Definition 3.2 (Sensitivity). [? ] For a function f : D → Rk, and two adjacent datasets




Sensitivity ∆f is only related to the type of function f . Intuitively, when k = 1 the sensitivity
of f is the maximum difference in the values that function f may take on a pair of databases
that differ in only one record.
There are two basic mechanisms meeting Definition 3.1, which are widely used currently
to realize differential privacy. One is the Laplace mechanism [? ] and the other is the
exponential mechanism [? ]. Laplacian mechanism uses the sensitivity as a parameter and
adds Laplacian noise to the output of the function. But for non-numeric queries, differential
privacy uses an exponential mechanism for noisy results because Laplace mechanism failed to
solve this problem. We will use Laplacian mechanism in our FRP algorithm (i.e., Algorithm
4.8) since our dataset is numeric.
3.3. Attacking privacy model
It is more and more popular to use mobile APPs nowadays. An infrastructure is rapidly
developing that encompasses a great number of users equipped with mobile terminals such
as mobile phones that posses location-targeting capabilities, e.g., built-in GPS receivers, and
datacom capabilities. At the same time, people like adding and making friends on many social
networking platforms which always ask for their personal information. Recommendation
systems also work like this so it always leads to privacy leaks. We consider two different
private attacking models: one is a geographical attacking model and the other one is a friend
relationship attacking model.
Geographical attacking model. Location-based services are increasingly becoming available
that return results relative to the locations of their users. In recent works, the fuzzy infor-
mation of the user’s real-time position was sent to the system in his client to obscure the
current position. It is worth noting that the location of the check-in POI is accurate while the
current real-time position is still obscure. The attacker can still obtain the user’s real-time
geographic location from the relevant information of the POI, e.g., when user Anna chooses
to record and share directly at a POI, such as the lake P of X University, her friends can
immediately receive the check-in information. The potential attacker will find her current
position easily basing on the POI’s information. Therefore, the privacy guarantee is not
enough and the position which the user creates by himself/herself needs to be blurred.
8
Friend relationship attacking model. In the POI recommendation system, the user’s pref-
erence of POIs is personal privacy information. The attacker can easily derive the user’s
private sensitive information, such as his political tendency, religious belief, and even sexual
orientation and so on, from the user’s preferred POIs. We assume that each user could be
a potential attacker, and they can rebuild the user’s preferred POIs with their background













Fig. 2. Attacking mode of POI preference
Example 3.3. [? ] Assuming that user Bron has been using the recommendation system
service for some time, the system has also recorded his POI preference. And Anna, a curious
friend of Bron, often goes out with Bron together, such as having dinner and signing in the
restaurant, watching the movies and signing in the cinema and so on. Recently Anna learns
that Bron likes to go to city Y alone every Saturday night, but she does not receive his check-
in information from the system, i.e., Bron may select the private check-ins which are not
instantly shared to his friends. Anna wants to know where Bron went every Saturday night.
So Anna submits a query to the system. As shown in Fig. 2, the query: “What are the POIs
nearby?” is firstly sent to the system server by Anna. The returned result would be top-K
POIs which are recommended to Anna with highest probability. There would be an unusual
POI returned such as “Hell Bar” and the unusual POI is not located in their city but in the
city Y . According to Anna’s background knowledge, she can infer that “Hell bar” is the POI
where Bron went every Saturday night with high probability.
In Example 3.3, Anna and Bron have high user similarity SuA,B, and they are friends
so their friend relationship SsA,B is also high. In the top-K results returned to Anna, some
abnormal positions appear. These abnormal positions are far away from her current location,
i.e, the geographical location value SgA,B is very low. Anna understands the recommendation
algorithm so she infers that such anomaly result is obtained mainly because her best friend
Bron has a similar preference. The following example shows another probable attacking
mode because of the similarity between users.
Example 3.4. [? ] It is still assumed that Bron has used the recommendation system
service for some time, the system has also recorded his POI preferences, which include several
unusual POIs: “Game Restaurant” (POIa), “Wonder Clothing Store” (POIb), “Homosexual
Museum” (POIc) and “Hell Bar” (POId). Bron selected to share the check-in information
of the POIa, POIb and POIc with his friends, but Bron would like to check in the POId
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secretly. Anna, a curious friend of Bron, doubts that Bron often goes to a bar called “Hell
Bar” (POId) which does not have a good reputation. So Anna sends a virtual information to
the server to tell that the POId is one of her preferred POIs. Then the server return Anna
a message: “People who like POId also often like POIa, POIb, POIc”. Since these three
POIs belong to unusual ones, and Bron also shared the three POIs publicly, Anna can infer
that POId is also Bron’s preferred POI with high probability.
In Examples 3.3 and 3.4, we have assumed that the attacker knows the recommendation
algorithm, but not the value of each parameter, e.g., α, β in Eq.(5) yet. These examples show
us two different attack modes based on friend relationship. We will solve these problems in
Section 4.2.
4. Privacy-preserving approaches
We investigate two attacking models which may reveal the private information of the
user’s location and friend ties in the previous sections so as to present the corresponding
privacy-preserving algorithms for them and then evaluate the utility and performance of our
approaches in detail. We also build the two methods into the recommendation framework
as our novel idea to return recommendations enjoying privacy guarantees followed by strict
theoretical analysis. To begin with, we introduce the following two definitions that will be
used throughout this section.
Definition 4.1 (Differential entropy). [? ] A differential entropy H(X) for a continu-




f(x) log f(x)dx, (8)
where Q is the support set of X, i.e., Q = {x | f(x) > 0}.
Analogous to the definition of privacy loss in [? ], we present privacy gain to meet our needs
for our privacy-preserving algorithms.
Definition 4.2 (Privacy gain). Let H(X) (X ∈ Dn) be the entropies of each record in the
database Dn and H ′(X) (X ∈ D′n) be the entropies of each record after a statistical release.
Therefore, privacy gain can be defined as the maximum information gain of a record in the
database, i.e., maxi≤n(H
′(Xi)−H(Xi)).
For a given database statistics release, the above definition links the differential privacy
guarantee to the largest information gain of a single record in the database.
4.1. GLP: Geographical location privacy-preserving algorithm
In this part, we will present the GLP algorithm (i.e., 〈r, h〉-privacy algorithm) to pre-
serve location privacy and deal with the shortcomings of 〈k, s〉-privacy [? ] as well for the
geographical attacking model discussed in Section 3.3.
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4.1.1. Enforcing 〈r, h〉-privacy
Our 〈r, h〉-privacy inherits the idea of 〈k, s〉-privacy but we do not generate virtual nodes
any more. We directly make the user position blur into a virtual circle, and the precise
position may exist anywhere in the circle. In this ambiguous mode, the probability of the
attacker inferring the user’s real position approaches 0. It is noteworthy that the attacker
may also have a kind of violent way to find the user, but the 〈r, h〉-privacy algorithm is able
to adjust the radius of the circle based on the local population, allowing the user to have
enough time to leave without being found. We also assume that an attacker can obtain all
the information from the server, as the 〈k, s〉-privacy. Note that if a user wants to send a
position to the server, a fuzzy one will simultaneously be sent in our assumption.
Definition 4.3 (〈r, h〉-Privacy). If a geographical location algorithm turns a user position
to a larger virtual circle (i.e., privacy area) with radius r based on local population density
h and the user can move anywhere in the circle, then the algorithm satisfies 〈r, h〉-privacy.
Our 〈r, h〉-privacy algorithm shown in Algorithm 4.4 takes both population density and
private geo-location into account. In our calculation, the population density hi of POIi is
determined by h(POIi), i.e., its total number of historical check-ins (line 1). We calculate
the radius of the virtual circle that needs to blur the current POIi based on hi according
to Eq.(9) (line 2). The size of the radius is determined by whether the current POIi is in
a densely populated or sparsely populated place (lines 3-7). Then we calculate the coordi-
nate of the new center o′i after selecting a random angle θ and appropriate distance l (lines
8-9). Finally, we generate a virtual circle as privacy area with center o′i and radius ri (line 10).
Algorithm 4.4. 〈r, h〉-Privacy algorithm
Input: POIi with coordinate (xi, yi)
Output: center o′i and radius ri
1: hi ← total number of historical check-ins h(POIi)
2: ri ← R(hi) according to Eq.(9)
3: if hi < 3 then
4: l← random(ri/2, ri)
5: else
6: l← random(0, ri)
7: end if
8: θ ← random(0, 2π)
9: Determine center o′i with coordinate (xi + l cos θ, yi + l sin θ)
10: POIi ← blur POIi into a circle with center o′i and radius ri
11: return o′i and ri
There are several ways to obtain the virtual circle radius ri. Here we use a simple and




· hi + rmax, (9)
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where rmax and rmin represent the upper and lower bounds of the virtual circle radius respec-
tively (their computations will be discussed later in Section ??), and hmax is the maximum
number of historical check-in numbers in all POIs (hmax = max{h(POIt), t = 1, 2, · · · , n}).
rmin is set to prevent some hot POIs from losing privacy guarantee since the virtual circle
will be very small when hi increases.
We will also face some extreme situations when using 〈r, h〉-privacy. To exemplify, the
historical check-in numbers of some POIs are only 1, and then the area of virtual circle
reaches maximum. Under this situation, attackers can quickly locate the precise position
of the POI and catch the target user. Hence, we let the distance between the user’s real
position p and the virtual center o′ satisfy dist(p, o′) ∈ [r/2, r] to ensure that the two points
are not too close, where r is the radius of the virtual circle.
4.1.2. Theoretical analysis of 〈r, h〉-privacy
We will in this section provide an attractive theoretical analysis of GLP algorithm by
using differential entropy which supplies a quantitative indicator for the effectiveness of
blurring, i.e., the privacy guarantee.
Theorem 4.5 (Distance distribution). In the xOy cartesian coordinate system shown in
Fig. 3, there is a point C(c, 0) on the x-axis and a circle with center O (the origin) and radius
r (0 < r < c). Let P (x0, y0) be any point in the circle and z be the distance between C and
P . Then the probability density function of this distance is f(z) = 2zψ/πr2.
Fig. 3. Geometric schematic of distance distribution
Proof. The two-dimensional random variable (x0, y0) of point P in the circle follows the
uniform distribution, so it obeys U(x20 +y
2
0 6 r
2) and their joint probability density function
is 1/(πr2).
To facilitate the calculation, we consider the polar coordinate system with pole C and
polar axis x. From Fig. 3 and some geometric knowledge, we know that the cumulative
distribution function of distance z is the area of the shadow region, and its probability
density function f(z) can be computed as the quotient of the length of the arc with angle
2ψ (marked as red in Fig. 3) and πr2, which is 2zψ/πr2. 
When the 〈r, h〉-privacy algorithm is added to the normal POI recommendation system,
POIs are blurred into virtual circles, the distance between any two POIs is required when
calculating the geographical location factor according to Eq.(4). We define the distance
zij = d(POIi, POIj) between two private fuzzy POIs as the distance between the center of
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one virtual circle and any point of the other virtual one with radius r so as to simplify the
calculation, i.e., the distance between C and a random point in the circle O in Fig. 3. In fact,
the definition of this distance can be verified if we tell the random point in another virtual
circle also follows the uniform distribution, hence, we simplify the calculation is reasonable.
For computing this distance, suppose c = t · r (t > 1), then z2 = r2 + c2 − 2rc cosϑ =




, which leads to tanψ = sinϑ
t−cosϑ . Meanwhile, let


































· (0.9e−1.5t + 1.6).
In addition, POIs blurring into circles result in the uncertainty of the distance, which
brings information increment. Therefore, the difference of differential entropy for computing























πr · ln 2
· (0.3e−0.5t + 0.02) (bits) > 0.
(10)
We conclude this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6 (Privacy gain of GLP). When adopting GLP algorithm to obtain the lo-
cation factor, instead of the normal method by Eq.(4), we will get a reasonable privacy gain,
which is positive because of Eq.(10).
4.2. FRP: Friend relationship privacy-preserving algorithm
We will in this section present the FRP algorithm based on differential privacy for the
friend relationship attacking models discussed in Section 3.3.
4.2.1. Designing FRP algorithm
In the social networking recommendation system, each user’s friends are potential at-
tackers. The attacker may infer the target user’s privacy information with high probability
if the user is very close to his friends (i.e., the value of friend relationship is high) in the
POI recommendation system. Our FRP algorithm tries to add enough noise to the factor of
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friend relationship, so that the attacker will not infer that his friends would have any con-
nection with the returned results from the system and will not obtain any relevant private
information.
We choose ε-differential privacy and Laplace mechanism to build our FRP algorithm.
The following corollary will be directly used in the design of the FRP algorithm.
Corollary 4.7 (Laplacian ε-differential privacy). [? ] For function f : D → Rk, sup-
pose that its sensitivity is ∆f , then f(D)+Lapk(∆f/ε) satisfies ε-differential privacy, where
Lapk(∆f/ε) is a k-dimensional vector obtained from the Laplacian distribution with a posi-
tion parameter of 0 and a scale parameter of ∆f/ε.
The FRP algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.8. We first replace one user ui’s one friend
relationship link from his friend set Fi randomly, i.e., ui has a new unknown friend, and
then generate a new neighbor set F ′i (line 1). Then, we calculate the new social influence list
SIi(F
′
i ) of user ui basing on F
′
i (line 2). Thereby, we can obtain the global sensitivity ∆f of
the query function according to Eq.(7) (line 3). Then we set position and scale parameters
(µ, λ) of the Laplacian noise to be (0,∆f/ε) as to Corollary 4.7 (line 4). Therefore, we can
get the Laplace distribution and add Laplacian noise to the original friend relationship factor
and get the noisy social influence set SI ′i of ui finally (lines 5-9).
Algorithm 4.8. Friend relationship privacy-preserving algorithm
Input: privacy parameter ε, ui’s friend set Fi and his social influence list SIi(Fi) for all
other users uk ∈ Fi
Output: ui’s noisy social influence list SI
′
i
1: F ′i ← Replace ui’s friend urandom ∈ Fi with uunknown /∈ Fi
2: Calculate ui’s new SIi(F
′
i ) according to Eq.(3)
3: Sensitivity ∆f ← maxFi,F ′i ‖SIi(Fi)− SIi(F
′
i )‖1
4: Laplacian parameters (µ, λ)← (0,∆f/ε)
5: for each uk in Fi do
6: SI ′i,k ← SIi,k + Lap1(λ)




9: return SI ′i
We can see that the friend relationship factor become smoother and closer, and it will
not exist the situation that the friend relationship of some users are particularly high from
the follow-up experimental results after we implement FRP in the recommendation system.
Furthermore, the problems in Examples 3.3 and 3.4 are solved because there is no particularly
high friend relationship factor value for Anna, then she can not infer any private information
on Bron.
4.2.2. Theoretical analysis of FRP
We still use the differential entropy to evaluate the FRP algorithm because it mainly
adopts wiping out the friend relationship values with great differences for fuzzy implemen-
tation. There is a property that the bigger difference between users’ friend relationship
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factor, the greater the information entropy, i.e., the greater uncertainty and the smaller the
probability that the attacker derives the user’s private information from the recommended
POIs.
Theorem 4.9 (Privacy gain of FRP). Friend relationship factor with differential pri-
vacy increases the information entropy and improves the uncertainty of the friend relation-
ship distribution, i.e., privacy gain of FRP algorithm equals to H(SI ′i)−H(SIi) > 0, which
protects the user’s information privacy.
Proof. We calculate the difference of SI ′i and SIi’s differential entropy to get the information
increment, i.e.,



























) and the second equation is obtained since the Lapla-
cian noise and SIi are independent. Then
2H(SI
′







where 0 < ε < 1, and ∆f = 1 if there exists a user having only one friend. Then, we have
2 ∆f/ε > 1, which implies H(SI ′i)−H(SIi) > 0. The proof is completed. 
4.3. Private POI recommendation method based on GLP and FRP
Algorithms 4.4 and 4.8 constitute our novel private recommendation method by adding
the privacy-preserving information on the aspects of geographical location and friend rela-
tionship. We will again employ differential entropy to measure the degree of privacy guar-
antee.
Lemma 4.10 (Functional entropy chain rule). Let X, Y, Z be three discrete random vari-
ables which are mutually independent and M = X + Y + Z. There exists H(M) = H(X) +
H(Y ) +H(Z).
Proof. Since M is a function of (X, Y, Z) and according to the chain rule of entropy, we have
H (M) 6 H (X, Y, Z) = H (X) +H (Y |X) +H (Z|X, Y ) 6 H (X) +H (Y ) +H (Z).
Furthermore, (X, Y, Z) is also a function of M and the random variables X, Y, Z are inde-
pendent of each other, the two equalities hold. The proof is completed. 
15
Theorem 4.11 (Total privacy gain). Under the assumption that the three parameters
(α, β and 1 − α − β) are pairwise independent, the entropy of the probability distribu-
tion (Eq.(5)) obtained by our private recommendation algorithm is greater than the normal
one and the total privacy gain is H(2zψ/πr2) +H(Lap1(∆f/ε)) bits.
Proof. It has been proved that the information entropy of geographical location and friend
relationship increased after adding privacy-preserving algorithms according to Theorems 4.6
and 4.9, where H(f(z)) = H(2zψ/πr2) > 0 and H(SI ′i) − H(SIi) > 0. Based on Eqs.(5),
(10), (11) and Lemma 4.10, the total privacy gain is given by
∆H = H(S ′i,j)−H(Si,j)
= H((1− α− β)Sui,j + αS ′ si,j + β S
′ g
i,j)−H((1− α− β)Sui,j + αSsi,j + β S
g
i,j)



















where the third equation is obtained due to the fact that H(ν S∗i,j) = H(S
∗
i,j) + log ν (ν ∈
(0, 1), ∗ ∈ {u, s, g}) and the fifth equation is because of H(Ssi,j) = H(ς SIi) = H(SIi) +
log |ς|(ς ∈ R). 
Remark that ∆H is the incremental differential entropy after adding the privacy-preserving
algorithm, and it represents the degree of privacy guarantee. For the friend relationship fac-
tor, differential privacy parameter ε and the query function sensitivity ∆f can be set by
users in advance to ensure a reasonable privacy guarantee. Regarding to the location factor,
in addition to the default radius of the virtual circle given by the system, users can also
customize the radius, since the radius r is also a potential control for privacy guarantee.
5. Empirical study
In this section, we will test the accuracy and privacy of the private algorithms and find out
all the optimal values of the parameters, e.g., α, β, rmax, to build an effective recommendation
system with privacy guarantee.
5.1. Experiment setup
5.1.1. Dataset description
We conduct experimental studies using data crawled from Foursquare1 which is one of the
most representative location-based services sites. The dataset also contains a large number
of friend ties while many other datasets do not have them. The data we selected is from
March 2010 to December 2011, including 24,941 users, 43,593 POIs and 2403,909 check-in
records and 120,883 friend ties. As shown in Fig. ??, after summarizing the check-in records,
1https://foursquare.com
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UserID POIID Position(latitude,longitude) Time DateID User1ID User2ID
USER_1675 LOC_1967 1.3095228064610511,103.90178203582764 0:48 0 6 1961
USER_1544 LOC_2505 1.3429556294180167,103.77525687217712 2:16 0 13 377
   USER_855 LOC_3369 1.2952893191369519,103.82989883422852 18:55 14 14 86
   USER_855 LOC_2909 1.2914708266088921,103.84985983371735 17:57 13 14 575
USER_2103 LOC_4944 1.3549042405307776,103.83102536201477 18:27 20 18 364
USER_2189 LOC_4633 1.4432620341955018,103.78509521484375 9:21 28 18 1956
USER_2186 LOC_2614 1.3561698888933271,103.98703336715698 11:25 30 20 341
USER_2186 LOC_4424 1.3011779381831814,103.83841753005981 12:32 12 22 80
(a) Check-in Data from Foursquare
UserID POIID Position(latitude,longitude) Time DateID User1ID User2I
USER_1675 LOC_1967 1.3095228064610511,103.90178203582764 0:48 0 6 196
USER_1544 LOC_2505 1.3429556294180 67,103.77525687217712 2:16 0 13 377
   USER_855 LOC_3369 1.2 5289319136 519,103. 2989883422852 18:55 14 14 86
   USER_855 LOC_2909 1.2914708266088921,103. 49859833 1735 17:57 13 14 575
USER_2103 LOC_4944 1.3549 42405307776,103.83102536201477 18:27 20 18 364
USER_2189 LOC_4633 1.4432620341955018,103.78509521 84375 9:21 28 18 195
USER_2186 LOC_26 4 1.3561698888933271,103.98703336715698 11:25 30 20 341
USER_2186 LOC_4424 1.3011779381831814,103.83841753005981 12:32 12 2 80
(b) Friendties
Fig. 4. Dataset from Foursquare
the user and POI check-in matrix is generated and its density is only about 2.41×10−3. Due
to the sparsity of the check-in matrix, the information we can get is really limited and the
effectiveness of the recommendation is usually not high enough. Therefore, we do mark off
x% (x = 10, 30, 50, generally taking 30 by default) of POIs visited by the user randomly for
each user to facilitate the evaluation of our algorithms. In the experiments, we apply the
recovered POIs to evaluate the performance of the recommendation algorithm.
5.1.2. Evaluation metrics
To evaluate the statistical accuracy of top-K ranking POIs, we apply two widely used
metrics, namely, recall@K and precision@K in which K is the number of recommended
POIs. Recall@K represents the fraction of labeled POIs that have been returned in the
dataset among top-K POIs, while precision@K is the fraction of labeled POIs among top-K
POIs. Finally, let F-value be the harmonic mean of recall@K (R) and precision@K (P) to



















where A represents the labeled POI set in the dataset and B represents the top-K POIs and
K will be 5, 10, 20 and 50. We know that the first two metrics mentioned take values from
[0, 1], and larger values indicate better quality of recommended POIs.
5.1.3. Comparative approaches
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposal, we compare our method with three other
state-of-the-art methods that involve a location-aware social POI recommendation model:
• USG [? ]: This method unifies a POI recommendation framework, which fuses user
preference to a POI with social influence and geographical influence. Note that USG
model has no data obfuscation.
• PPTR [? ]: The model is for privacy-preserving trust-oriented POI recommendation,
which involves a partially homomorphic encryption model.
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• PLAS [? ]: This method is a location-aware social POI recommendation model using
Paillier’s homomorphic property to protect private data, in which Paillier is a proba-
bilistic public key cryptosystem.
• PMLS [? ]: PMLS stands for privacy-preserving method based on location sensitivity.
It exploits differential privacy for location recommendation based on location sensitiv-
ity division, which is similar to our FRP that adopts social sensitivity in differential
privacy.
5.1.4. Impact of parameter settings
In this section, we discuss the impact of parameter settings to ranking recommendation
accuracy. We mainly analyse the impact of both the maximum and minimum radii of the
virtual circle in the proposed GLP algorithm and the weight coefficients α, β for friend
relationship factor and geographical location factor, respectively.
Determining the weights of three POI factors. In order to recommend top-K POIs to a user,
we need to calculate the probability Si,j according to Eq.(5). Here, we employ our private
methods (Algorithms 4.4 and 4.8) to calculate Ssi,j and S
g
i,j respectively. More importantly,
we need to determine their weights, that is, the values of α and β. Let K = 5, we use various
combinations of α and β to test precision and recall of POI recommendation method, and
we choose the values when the best performance is achieved, see Section ??. We also use
the obtained values of α and β for other top-K recommendation.
Fig. 5. The check-in number of POI (logarithmic)
Determining the radii in the GLP algorithm. There are several parameters not determined
yet in Eq.(9) for obtaining the radius of the virtual circle in our GLP algorithm. As shown in
Fig. ??, the user number of x-axis and the POI check-in number of y-axis are log-processed,
and it can fit into an approximate straight line, which indicates that the original data are
better fitted to the exponential mechanism. We can see the check-in number h of POIs
starts at about 3500 and then drops rapidly until 1. The maximum hmax can reach more
than 10000, and overview all the POI historical records, only a small amount of POI can
reach 10000 or so while the vast majority of the POI history check-in number even less than
10, i.e., the check-in number which is less than 100 accounts for nearly 99% of the total.
Hence, the virtual circle radius of most POIs is very close to rmax and it is more important
18
to determine the upper bound of the radius than the lower bound. Due to this fact, we set
hmax = 100 by trial and error approach. Then, about 500(1%) of the hottest POIs’ virtual
radii will achieve the minimum rmin. On the contrary, the number of unpopular POIs, whose
history check-in numbers are 3 or less, exceeds 7000. Therefore, about 18% of the POIs’
virtual radii will achieve the maximum rmax. The empirical value of rmax is 200 (meters)
so that the maximum area of the virtual circle is Scircle = π · r2max ≈ 12500m2, only 1/8 of
maximum private area of 〈k, s〉-privacy algorithm [? ].
5.2. Experimental results
5.2.1. Weights of three factors when K = 5
Optimal Point
(a) Recall@5 of normal algorithm
Optimal Point
(b) Precision@5 of normal algorithm
Fig. 6. Recall@5 and Precision@5 of normal algorithm
In this part, we conduct experiments on normal and private algorithms to determine the
weights of the three POI factors when K = 5, respectively. In Fig. ??, the best performance
of normal algorithm is achieved when α and β are both equal to 0.1. The result is probably
due to the fact that the user similarity factor plays a decisive role among the three factors.
The higher value of user similarity usually makes contribution to the higher performance of
the recommendation algorithm. At the same time, the factors of friendship and geographical
location are also non-negligible for the recommendation algorithm since they at least take
an account for 20%. On the other hand, considering the three factors alone, we know that
the friend relationship factor has the minimum effect on the performance of recommendation
among all the factor combinations, so the contribution of the friend relationship factor is
less than the others.
As shown in Fig. ??, in the adjustment of the linear parameters of the private recom-
mendation algorithm, it can be seen that the private algorithm does not reduce the validity
of the recommendations significantly, and both α and β are exactly equal to 0.1 when recall
rate and precision rate get the optimal point. From Fig. ?? and Fig. ??, we see that the
private algorithm does not have a large impact on the accuracy of recommendation result
based on both recall rate and precision rate, so we conclude that it is reasonable to add our
private algorithms 4.4 and 4.8 into normal recommendation system.
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Optimal Point
(a) Recall@5 of private algorithm
Optimal Point
(b) Precision@5 of private algorithm
Fig. 7. Recall@5 and Precision@5 of private algorithm
5.2.2. Effect of varying ε
Evaluation of our private algorithms need to be carried out in two aspects: one is the
degree of privacy protection, and the other one is the performance of the recommendation
algorithm. The experiments above has explained that the effectiveness of the private algo-
rithm is as good as the normal one. The smaller ε, the greater noise added in the factor of
friend relationship, and the higher degree of privacy protection. While the privacy param-
eter ε = 0, the private algorithm reduces to the normal one. The experimental results are
shown in Fig. ??, where the information entropy of the privacy-preserving algorithm is higher
than that of the normal version, and this also confirms the theoretical analysis of private
algorithm in Section 4.3. For the different privacy parameters ε (ε = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9),
when ε become larger, the more close to 1, the added noise is relatively smaller, and then
the information entropy is gradually reduced. When ε = 0.1, the information entropy is
already 9 times that of the normal version. And when ε = 0.5, the information entropy has
dropped rapidly to 1/5 of that when ε = 0.1. However, the information entropy is still more
than double of the normal version, so we conclude that the privacy guarantee of the private
algorithm has been greatly improved compared to the normal one. Fig. ?? also shows that
the private algorithm achieves a good balance between privacy and accuracy in terms of
recall rate, precision rate and F -value of them when K = 10.
5.2.3. Effect of varying K
We will use the optimal linear parameters α = 0.1 and β = 0.1 for the following experi-
ments. We also set ε as 0.5 to guarantee a proper privacy gain according to the experimental
results just above. The recall rate @K and the precision rate @K (where K = 5, 10, 20, 50)
of the recommendation algorithm for the normal and private algorithms are shown in Fig. ??.
No matter the value K is, the performance of the normal and the private recommendation
algorithm is roughly the same, and the private algorithm is not worse than the normal ver-
sion in terms of the recall rate and precision rate. Note that the user-POI check-in matrix
of our data is very sparse. The precision rate is 0.2 with a matrix sparseness of 2.41× 10−3
in our experiment.
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Fig. 8. Performances under different privacy parameters

















The recall rate of normal and private algorithms
Normal algorithm
Private algorithm















The precision rate of normal and private algorithms
Normal algorithm
Private algorithm
Fig. 9. Recall@K and Precision@K of normal and private algorithms
5.2.4. Comparison in precision and recall with comparative approaches
Fig. ?? depicts the performance of Top-K (K = 5, 10, 20, 50) recommendations of all
approaches, where ε is set as 0.5 as above. Fig. ?? (a) shows the recall@K performance,
and Figs. ?? (b) shows the precision@K performance. See that the precision of our method
degrades with the increase of K, while the recall upgrades. From Fig. ??, we can observe
that the proposal outperforms PPTR, PLAS and PMLS in both precision and recall rates.
For example, the precision@20 and recall@20 of the proposal are respectively 8.2% and 2.6%
higher than PLAS. Note that the PMLS and our proposal both involve a differential privacy
technique while our proposal is superior to PMLS in terms of all evaluation indicators,
regardless of the change of K. This is mainly because that PMLS has to manually set the
privacy parameter ε based on the number of POI check-ins, while we can automatically
determine the radius of virtual circle according to Eq.(9). Hence, our approach is not only
more effective but also easier to implement without having to spend a lot of labor costs.
Besides, we can find that when ε = 0.5, the ranking prediction accuracy of our proposal
is just a little lower than USG, e.g., the precision@5 and recall@5 of our method are only
3.5% and 1.4% lower than that of USG. The results, together with the experimental results
in Section ??, present that our proposal could achieve decent accuracy on the premise of
privacy preservation and depict that a good balance could be made between the prediction
accuracy and the goal of privacy preservation based on our proposal.
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(a) Top-K ranking recall













(b) Top-K ranking precision
Fig. 10. Performance comparison in Top-K ranking accuracy on recall@K and precision@K
6. Conclusion and future work
Exploiting privacy guarantee in a POI recommendation system is significative and feasi-
ble without taking visible hit in accuracy of the recommendation. Our idea is to incorporate
the user interest, fuzzy social ties and fuzzy geographical location in the recommendation.
We propose two privacy-preserving algorithms, namely GLP and FRP, to offer privacy guar-
antee of geographical location and social relationships independently and provide a differ-
ential entropy method for demonstrating their privacy gains. We conduct a comprehensive
performance evaluation over a large-scale real dataset collected from Foursquare. In our
experiments, we tune enough parameters (e.g., the weights α, β of POI factors, privacy pa-
rameter ε) and we see that applying the two privacy-preseving algorithms into a normal
recommendation system does not decrease the accuracy of the recommended POIs in terms
of precision and recall. The experimental results also show the robustness and effectiveness
of the GLP and FRP algorithms.
Direction for future work could include more effective methods for the privacy gain of
the private algorithms which need to be defined concretely because the definition of privacy
is still a conundrum.
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